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Abstract
The Axiom of Monotonicity (AM) is a necessary condition for a
number of expected utility representations, including those obtained
by de Finetti (1930), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Sav-
age (1954). The paper reports on experiments that directly test AM
by eliminating strategic uncertainty, context, and peer e¤ects. In this
sterile and simple environment we do not observe AM violations under
uncertainty but we do observe violations under ambiguity.
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1 Introduction
Ellsberg (1961) asserted that under ambiguity, decision makers violate either
Savages Sure Thing Principle (Postulate 2 in Savage) or complete and tran-
sitive preferences over acts. Since then, Savages axioms have been relaxed
to derive, amongst others, the Choquet Expected Utility representation in
Schmeidler (1989), the Maxmin Expected Utility representation in Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) and the representation of Klibano¤, Marinacci and
Mukerji (2005). A weaker postulate, implied by the Sure Thing Principle
(STP), is the Axiom of Monotonicity (AM). This axiom states that if some
act is preferred to another in all states of the world, then the same prefer-
ence should hold under uncertainty over the state space.1 Various versions of
AM, act as necessary conditions for all the above mentioned expected utility
representations (see Gilboa 2009).
Apart from these representations, the intuitively appealing Axiom of
Monotonicity is a necessary condition for the earlier expected utility rep-
resentation obtained by Savage (1954). Appropriate modications of the
axiom act as necessary conditions for representations obtained in de Finetti
(1930), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Anscombe and Aumann
(1963). In game-theoretic settings, AM provides an epistemic foundation for
the choice of dominant strategies.
In this paper we present an experimental test of AM. To our knowledge
this is the rst test of AM in a salient and non-strategic setting. Our re-
sults indicate that AM is signicantly violated under ambiguity but not un-
der uncertainty.2 Thus, under ambiguity, our results favor expected utility
1Savage used the term Sure Thing Principle to motivate Postulate 2. Ellsberg calls
postulate 2, the Sure Thing Principle and so do Gilboa (2009) and others. Shar and
Tversky (1992a) and others, however, call AM, the Sure Thing Principle.
2The literature is not consistent in the use of the terms ambiguity and uncertainty. We
are also loose in using these terms. By uncertainty we mean a situation where people are
likely to agree on probabilities. By ambiguity we mean a situation where people need not
agree on probabilities or that probability is a correct metric of measurement. Our notion
of ambiguity is consistent with a Knightian notion of uncertainty.
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representations which do not assume AM. Examples being the case based
qualitative beliefsof Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001) and the state-space
free approach of Ahn (2008).
2 The Axiom of Monotonicity
In the world of Savage a decision maker is aware of a set of actions A, a set of
states of nature S and a set of consequences Z. Acts are functions from S to
Z and A is the set of all such functions. An event in E is a subset of S and Ec
is the complement of E in S. Formally, the decision maker has complete and
transitive preference,  (), over all acts in A. Dene conditional preference
of f over g in E as; f E g if and only if f 0  g0 where f = f 0 and g = g0 in
E and f 0 = g0 in Ec (Gilboa, 2009). Then, AM is stated as :
The axiom of monotonicity (AM): If f E g and f Ec g then f  g.
AM should not be confused with Savages Sure Thing Principle (STP)
which is dened as follows. Let f , f 0, g0 and g be four acts and E be a
subset of S such that: (i) f(s) = f 0(s) and g(s) = g0(s) for all s belonging
to E and (ii) f(s) = g(s) and f 0(s) = g0(s) for all s not belonging to E.
Then, STP states that f  g if and only if f 0  g0. As mentioned earlier,
there are several papers, both theoretical and experimental, which follow
from Ellsbergs criticism of STP. Halevy (2007) provides a nice experimental
evaluation of these theories. The paper also provides an adequate discussion
of the literature.
AM, however, is a weaker condition. It is implied by STP along with
completeness and transitivity (see Gilboa 2009, pp. 141). However, AM may
hold even when STP is violated. To see this, consider the following example
where STP is violated but AM is not.
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s1 s2
f a b
f 0 a a
g b b
g0 b a
The table above depicts a state space S = fs1; s2g; two consequences
Z = fa; bg and the set of all acts A = ff; f 0; g:g0g. Let preferences be given
by f  g, f 0  g, g0  f 0, g0  g, f 0  f , g0  f . These preferences are
complete and do not violate transitivity. Now using f  g and the denition
of conditional preferences we get f 0 s1 g. Using g0  f , we get f 0 s2 g.
We already have by assumption that f 0  g. So AM is satised for the pair
of actions f 0 and g. The reader can verify that the antecedent of AM is not
satised for any other pair of acts. This implies that AM holds.3 It is easy
to see that f  g and g0  f 0 violate STP.
AM is a fundamental axiom for most of decision theory and has nat-
ural implications in game theoretic settings as well. In a game, player is
pure strategy can be thought of as an act which maps from opponentspure
strategy proles (the state space) to her own payo¤s. If for all such proles
(states), a strategy si is strictly preferred to any other strategy then si is
said to be a dominant strategy. When i knows the game, and knows that
strategy choice is independent across players, she knows that she can never
be better o¤ by choosing a strategy di¤erent from si.
Shar and Tversky (1992a) were perhaps the rst to question the validity
of AM. They termed the violations in their experiment, the disjunction
e¤ect.They ran several hypothetical experiments. In one of them, subjects
were asked if they would choose to go for a vacation to Hawaii, conditional
on knowing that they have passedor failed an exam. Around 55% of
the subjects opted for the vacation under either contingency. Another set of
3Notice that although  is complete, conditional preferences, s1 ; may not be. For
example, preference s1 is not dened between f and f 0. A resolution could then be to
say that f is indi¤erent to f 0 in s1. Since the completeness of conditional preferences do
not matter for the purpose of this paper, we shall not deal with this issue any further.
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subjects were asked to chose before they knew the result. Only 32% opted
for the vacation. These gures are quite remarkable and thought-provoking.
However, because these experiments were non-salient and placed in a strong
context it is not clear how to interpret the results.
Our main objective was to design a simple and direct test of AM. In our
experiment, subjects rst made a sequence of two choices, each between two
di¤erent monetary amounts. These choices were very simple. Each boiled
down to essentially choosing between a higher and a lower amount of money.
Then, we presented each subject with a choice between two lotteries. The
rst, dominantlottery, used prizes that were revealed preferred, i.e., equal
to the amounts chosen earlier, and the dominatedlottery used prizes that
were revealed inferior. With this structure a violation of AM would appear
as the choice of the dominated lottery.
The nature of uncertainty was at the heart of our experiment. To ob-
tain the most direct test of AM we rst implemented choice under simple
uncertainty. We were very explicit about all the details of the randomiza-
tion process, used a physical randomization device - a bingo cage, and set
the probability for resolving the chosen lottery at 50%4. But upholding AM
under these simple conditions does not necessarily imply that AM holds. A
tougher test of AM is one under ambiguity. For example, the disjunction
e¤ect, which is at present the strongest evidence suggesting violation of AM,
has been found exclusively under conditions of ambiguity5. Therefore, in the
second treatment, we induced ambiguity by giving subjects no information
about the number of balls in the bingo cage. Under these conditions subjects
4Notice that although AM is independent of beliefs we wanted to present subjects with
very simple probabilities that they are familiar with.
5There is a great leap from the simple uncertainty environment where the subject is
familiar with the randomization device and understands the chances over outcomes, and
the ambiguity environment where the chances are obscure. Under ambiguity, computing
the set of relevant states, as Savage referred to them, may be quite complex. This higher
complexity of the state-space may then lead the subject to apply an alternative heuristic for
choosing between the lotteries, e.g., see the case-based approach by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1995).
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could disagree on what the objective probabilities are.
In other experiments by Shar and Tversky (1992b), subjects played a
sequence of various prisoners dilemma games with randomly chosen oppo-
nents. At times, subjects saw their opponents move before choosing their own
actions and at times they did not. Again more than 30% of subjects who
defected whenever they observed the opponents choice, cooperated when the
opponentss choice was unobservable. Croson (1999) used across-subject de-
sign to support the disjunction e¤ect hypothesis. In her experiment, subjects
often cooperated in the simple prisoners dilemma. But when asked to state
their belief about the opponents play before choosing their own strategy,
they defected at much higher rate.
Because our experiment is within-subject it could also be viewed as a
screening procedure for subjectsbehavioral types. We could identify each
subject as being behaviorally consistent or inconsistent with AM. This prop-
erty allows us to ask how inconsistency with AM translates into play in the
prisoners dilemma (PD) game. After we screened the subjects for their types
we had them play a one-shot prisoners dilemma with a randomly chosen op-
ponent. A naive conjecture could be that those who have violated AM should
cooperate at higher rate than the rest. However, as we will argue later, this
conjecture is far from clear because the PD game is a much more compli-
cated environment. It presents subjects with strategic ambiguity and could
invoke social or other regarding preferences (e.g., Andreoni and Samuelson
2006, Fehr and Schmidt 2000, Bolton and Ockenfels 1999, Rabin 1993) that
are absent in our screening procedure and are typically hard to measure or
control6.
6These are also the reasons why games are not an ideal environment for testing AM.
5
3 The experiment and hypotheses
3.1 The experiment
The objective was to create a simple, nonstrategic environment in which
violation of AM can be observed directly. For this purpose we designed an
experiment in which each treatment had two parts and each part consisted
of two tasks. The rst part was intended to elicit the antecedent of AM and
the second to verify its implication. The rst part was very simple. In task 1
the subject was asked to choose between two options R (Right) and L (Left).
If she chose R she got $85 and if she chose L she got $75. In task 2, she
again had to choose between two options R and L. But now if she chose R
she received $35 and if she chooses L she received $25.
In task 3 a subject was asked to choose between the dominantlottery
R and a the dominatedlottery L as shown in the Figure 1, panel (a). AM
implies that if the subject chose the higher amount in both tasks 1 and 2
then the same subject should prefer the dominant lottery R; with prizes $85
and $35; to the dominated lottery L with prizes $75 and $257.
Figure 1: Task 3
Fixed Columns Switched Columns
Left Right Left Right
B-ball Num. > 20 75 85 B-ball Num. > 20 85 75
B-ball Num.  20 25 35 B-ball Num.  20 25 35
(a) (b)
Note: B-ball Num.refers the number on the ball chosen from the bingo cage.
Interesting situations occur when the subject takes the lower amount in
one of the tasks 1 or 2. Then, Fixed Columns (FC) version of task 3, as shown
7Our payo¤s are very similar to those used by Shar and Tversky (1992b) and Croson
(1999) who have both found a large amount of disjunct behavior in the prisoners dilemma
game with almost identical payo¤s. The only di¤erence is that in our case the lower payo¤s
of L and R are 25 and 35 instead of 30 and 35.
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in the Figure 1 panel (a), is a test of AM only if we are willing to believe that
the subject had made a mistake in tasks 1 or 2. But if say the lower amount
were truly preferred to the higher amount in task 1, then the appropriate
test of AM is the Switched Columns (SC) formulation of task 3 as shown in
panel (b). Similar SC formulation is needed for a choice of the lower amount
in task 2. We ran one of our treatments (the Uncertainty treatment) under
both conditions FC and SC8. The other treatment (Ambiguity) was run only
under SC condition.
The lotteries R and L in task 3 were resolved with the same random-
izations device - a bingo cage. The balls in the bingo cage were uniquely
labeled with numbers between 1-40. The higher prize of the chosen lottery
was paid out whenever the number on the ball drawn from the bingo cage
exceeded 20. Otherwise, the subject earned the lower prize. In the Uncer-
taintytreatment we gave the subjects all the details about the bingo cage.
Subjects were told that there were exactly 40 uniquely labeled balls in the
bingo cage. Then, they were all invited come to the front of the room9 where
all the balls from the bingo-cage were lined up and ordered in the ascending
order so they could easily inspect that all we told them was true. In the sec-
ond Ambiguitytreatment subjects were told that the balls were uniquely
labeled from 1-40 but we did not reveal anything about how many balls were
in the bingo cage. The bingo-cage contained 35 balls. Subjects did see the
bingo cage placed in the front of the room but were not invited to come and
inspect the contents.
The nal task of the experiment was the prisoners dilemma game with
8Only one treatment was run under both conditions because in the experiment only a
few subjects had chosen the lower amount in tasks 1 or 2. It would have been very costly to
run both treatments under both conditions. The Uncertainty treatment was deemed more
appropriate because there the behavior of subjects who had chosen the higher amount in
both tasks 1 and 2 was very convincing: they committed virtually zero violations in task 3.
Therefore, for example under the assumption that subjects choice of the lower amount in
one of the tasks 1 or 2 was due to a mistake and mistakes are not correlated across tasks,
we would have had a clear prediction of no violation of AM under FC condition even for
this group of subjects. We refer the reader to the results section for further discussion.
9This was done row-by-row.
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payo¤s weve been using all along. Subjects were told that in this task (and
only in this task) they are matched with one randomly chosen participant.
The frame of the PD is presented in Figure 2
Figure 2: Task 4
Left Right
The person who you
are matched with
chose: Left
75 , 75 25 , 85
The person who you
are matched with
chose: Right
25 , 85 35 , 35
To minimize the chance of distortions due to possible peer and exper-
imenter e¤ects10 we minimized social distance by adopting a double-blind
protocol. Subjects were separated from each other by blinders that fully sur-
rounded each of them and provided complete privacy. In the experiment each
subject was identied by a number that was inscribed on a card randomly
10Tasks 1 and 2 are so simple and transparent that they may seem unnecessary. After
all, who would ever take less money if more is available? We can think of at least two
reasons why this could happen. For instance, subjects may try to avoid the shame from
appearing greedy in front of their peers or the experimenter (who might become their
future professor). There is an established literature on the importance of double-blind
protocol in preventing these peer-e¤ects in experiments (Ho¤man et al. 1996, Eckel and
Grossman 1996).
We have had our own share of experience. In our early pilots that were run pen-and-
paper in a nonanonymous classroom setting we found as much as 50% of subjects taking
the lower amount in tasks 1 and 2. This stands in stark contrast with the data we obtained
in the actual experiment in which we used (i) double-blind procedure and (ii) we stated
clearly in the instructions that the experiment was funded by an external grant in order to
mitigate the possibility that subjects think they are taking money out of our own pocket.
The second explanation for taking the lower amount could be that some subjects are
simply more prone to making mistakes than others. Their behavior might be qualitatively
di¤erent form those who do not make mistakes. In either case, whether the lower amount
is taken due to preferences or mistakes, our initial two tasks 1 and 2 are able to detect
such person and allow us to analyze these types separately from the rest.
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drawn from a hat. This number was entered by the subject on the opening
screen of the software. At the end of the experiment the experimenter put all
payments in the respective envelopes with the corresponding numbers writ-
ten on the top of them. One of the subjects was again randomly selected to
hand out the envelopes to everyone else in the room11,12.
To get at our questions we used a within subject design in which tasks
come in sequence. Since under SC, payo¤s in task three were contingent on
task 1 and 2 choices, tasks were unfolded to the subject one at a time. A
computer which observed choices in tasks 1 and 2, constructed and presented
the subject with task three.
Sequencing of tasks could cause order e¤ects. We control for order e¤ects
by randomizing the order of tasks. To preserve the natural structure of the
AM implication we only randomized the order of the tasks 1 and 2 and the
order of tasks 3 and 4. Furthermore, we were worried that responding to
tasks may become automatic if the same column with the higher amount(s)
is always associated with the same button, e.g., Right. For this reason we
also randomized the assignment of columns to buttons for each task and each
subject.
The experiment was run at ITAM in the computer laboratory. The soft-
ware was written in Visual Basic 6.0. Together 162 subjects participated in
the experiment. The Ambiguity and Uncertainty treatments consisted of 3
and 6 sessions respectively with 12 - 20 students per session. The students
were recruited form the 1st year introductory courses o¤ered at ITAM, i.e.,
they had only minimal exposure to economics. The experiment was run in
11In exchange for the envelope she collected the card with the number that matched the
envelope. The cards were then handed back to the experimenter.
12One of the major di¢ culties with double blind procedure is with having subjects sign
the payment receipts. At that point a name and face is clearly related to the amount (and
decisions) made in the experiment. We by-passed this problem by having each subject
sign a payment form with the average amount earned by a subject in the experiment. This
procedure was explained to subjects verbally.
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Spanish13,14. Our assistant who is a native Spanish speaker has read the in-
structions aloud for the whole class. This was followed by a round of privately
answering subjectsindividual questions. The opening screen of the software
contained a page of comprehension questions that had to be answered cor-
rectly by everyone before the experiment could begin. The experiment lasted
for about 45 minutes. Subjects were paid 50 Pesos as a show fee and half of
their total point earnings in the experiment. The average payment was 155
Pesos.
3.2 Hypotheses
In our experiment we observe choices and not preferences nor the subjects
construct of the state space. Therefore, before we state our hypotheses it is
necessary to dene an observational equivalent of the AM for our experiment.
This we call the monotonicity principle:
Monotonicity Principle: Choice satises the principle of monotonicity
if the dominant lottery is chosen in task three.
Recall that in the Uncertainty treatment we carefully explained to sub-
jects all details of the randomization device in task 3. If this was understood
by them, then they must have considered only two kinds of states of the world.
Lets refer to them as the high state (h), in which the number on the ball
drawn from the bingo cage is higher than 20, and the low state (l), in which
the number is lower than 20. Then, the state space can then represented by
S = fh; lg. Let c denote choice in task t and let a denote the alternative
which was not chosen. Task 1 can be viewed as a choice conditional on h
such that the utility of the chosen amount is preferred to the alternative, i.e.,
u(c1; h) h u(a1; h). Similarly for task 2 we have, u(c2; l) l u(a2; l). Since
13The instructions and the software were initially written in English, then translated
to Spanish by our assistant, and consequently translated back to English by our second
assistant to ensure the accuracy of the translation.
14The English version of the instructions can be found in the Appendix.
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in task 3 the dominant lottery gives prizes u(c1; h) on h and u(c2; l) on l, by
conditional preference it is preferred on both h and l. Then, by AM, it must
be preferred to the dominated lottery. This implies our rst hypothesis.
H1: If AM holds under uncertainty, then we will observe zero (negligible
number of) dominated lottery choices in the Uncertainty treatment.
In the Ambiguity treatment the randomization process is obscure and
objective probabilities cannot be computed. If a subject does not fully un-
derstand all the details of how lotteries are resolved then she may resort to an
alternative (perhaps simpler) heuristics. For example, she may start lling
the missing pieces based on her own experiences that are readily available to
her. This could lead her to consider as relevant some states of the world that
do not physically exist. If that happens, however, then the decision problem
as perceived by the subject could be represented in the Savagian language
as follows: in addition to states fh; lg there may be an additional state m
(middle say) that conditions the outcome on the choice of the lottery, i.e.,
L R
h 75 85
m 75 35
l 25 35
Notice that if this is an accurate representation of the perceived decision
problem then AM is vacuously true in our setting15. To minimize the pos-
sibility of this type of mis-perception we decided to use a physical random-
ization device - the bingo cage - which was pre-loaded with balls and was
15An alternative formulation of the problem would provide a test of AM even under this
state-space specication. If the payo¤s were reshu­ ed as follows
L R
h 75 85
l 25 35
then the lottery R gives the higher amount in all states than L. A more complicated
strategic version of this decision problem has been run as a treatment by Croson (1999).
She found no violations AM.
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on display in the front of the room for the duration of the experiment. The
experimenters made sure they did not touch the bingo cage. Based on the
assumption that subjects did not mis-percieve the physical structure of the
experiment we obtain the following hypothesis.
H2: If AM holds under both uncertainty and ambiguity, then we will
observe zero (negligible number of) dominated lottery choices in both Un-
certainty and Ambiguity treatments.
H2 can be viewed as a joint hypothesis of AM and the absence of non-
relevant states form the decision problem. This view will prove useful later
when we give interpretation of our results. Our next question of interest
is how does a violation of AM a¤ect the play in the prisoners dilemma.
To choose a strategy in a game the player has to form a belief about the
opponents strategy. This necessarily puts the player in the situation of
ambiguity. We speculate that the same factors that are responsible for the
violation of AM in the decision theoretic setting will also contribute to the
choice of the dominated strategy (cooperation) in the PD game.
H3: Subjects who violated AM will cooperate in the prisoners dilemma
at higher rate than subjects who did not violate AM.
4 Results
As the rst step we check the consistency of behavior in tasks (1, 2, and 4)
that were una¤ected by treatment variations.
The Table 1 shows that there are indeed no di¤erences. In addition, there
is nothing irregular about the behavior in three tasks 1, 2 and 4. In tasks 1
and 2 most of the subjects revealed preferences for money and took the higher
amount. Somewhat surprisingly, however, a minority (about 15-20%) took
the lower amount at least once. We will return to this subgroup in the later
12
Table 1: Choice frequencies in tasks 1, 2 and 4
Treatments
Ambiguity Uncertainty
Tasks 1 and 2: took the higher amount 85% 82.4%
Task 4: chose the dominated strategy 45% 47.1%
No. of observations 60 102
Note: Task 3 is left out intentionally and is analyzed in detail in Table 2.
section. Task 4 was the PD game. The observed cooperation rates are 45-
47% and this is consistent with the previous ndings in the literature16. Next
we turn to our main result - the evidence on the violation of monotonicity.
4.1 Violation of the Monotonicity Axiom
Task 3 presented the subjects with a choice between two lotteries. The
dominant lottery, in which the prizes were the chosen amounts in the initial
two tasks, and the dominated lottery, with prizes equal to the amounts left
unchosen.
Table 2: Dominated lottery choices in Task 3
Treatments
Ambiguity Uncertainty
Pooled SC FC
Higher amount in both task 1 and 2 17.7% 2.4% 4.4% 0%
(9/51) (2/82) (2/45) (0/39)
Lower amount in task 1 or task 2 66.7% - 72.7% 28.6%
(6/9) - (8/11) (2/7)
Combined 25% - 17.9% 4.4%
(15/60) - (10/56) (2/46)
Note: The ratios in parenthesis give the actual number of observations.
The top row presents number of violations for the sub-sample (82-85%) of
subjects who have chosen the higher amount in both initial two tasks. This
16Fishers exact test shows no signicant di¤erences between frequencies for Tasks 1 and
2 (p-value = 0:687) and also for Task 4 (p-value = 0:429).
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gives the cleanest test of AM because for these subjects we are condent that
the antecedent of AM is satised. Furthermore, for this subgroup there was
no di¤erence between SC and FC conditions. All four tasks were exactly the
same. Therefore, we present a test based on the pooled data. The incidence
of dominated lottery choices between Ambiguity was as high as 17.7% and
Uncertainty only 2.4%. The di¤erence is signicant on 1% level with the p-
value of one-sided (two-sided) Fishers exact test17 equal to 0.006 (0.008)18.
Based on this evidence we accept H1 and reject H2.
Result 1: AM holds in the most basic decision-theoretic setting. Under
uncertainty only 2.4% of subjects violate AM. Under ambiguity a signicant
17.7% of subjects violate AM.
The subjects who chose the lower amount in at least one of the tasks 1
or 2 account for about 15-20% of the data. This makes them less important
but nonetheless a quite interesting group. Their dominated lottery choices
are shown in the second row of Table 219. For these subjects we have much
less condence that the antecedent of AM is satised because the choice of
the lower amount in task 1 or 2 seems somewhat strange. It could be that
this choice is preference driven but it could also be that it is a product of a
mistake.
We cannot and would not want to rule out either of the explanations.
Under the assumption that all choices in our experiment are preference driven
the appropriate test of AM is the formulation of task 3 with switched columns,
i.e., condition SC. On the other hand, if the choice of the lower amount
occurred due to a mistake, then the appropriate test of AM is task 3 with
the xed columns, i.e., condition FC.
The data in Table 2 show that under preference assumption it would be
17The p-values in the reminder of this paper are based on this test.
18The di¤erence between Ambiguity and individual uncertainty conditions is also sig-
nicant. One-sided (two-sided) p-values for the Ambiguity vs. SC condition are 0.064
(0.108) and for the Ambiguity vs. FC condition are 0.009 (0.011).
19Additional tables allowing a deeper look in the data can be found in the Appendix.
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that majority of subjects, 72.7%, violate AM. Under the mistakes assumption
the proportion of would-be violators drops down to 28.8% but it is still far
from negligible.20 From our experiment we cannot determine whether choices
are preference- or mistake-driven. But irrespective of which one it is the data
indicate that the number of AM violators is likely to be higher for this group
then for the previous group21.
4.2 Play in the Prisoners Dilemma
In the previous sections we have shown that a substantial proportion of
subjects violate AM. This brings up a question about the implications of this
nding for the dominance play in games. Recall from our previous discussion
that both Shar and Tversky (1992, 1993) and Croson (1999) have found a
large proportion of what appeared to be AM violations (in the order of 30%)
in the prisoners dilemma game. They called this the disjunction e¤ect.
However, PD game arguably involves more complexity than our nonstrategic
setting in task 3. Cooperation can occur for other reasons that are unrelated
to the monotonicity of choice. For instance, in the PD game players split
the payo¤s between the two of them which can bring in social preferences
to play a role in their decisions22; secondly, in the PD game players face
strategic uncertainty which requires that they form beliefs about the others
preferences and strategy choices. This is certainly a great leap from simple
bingo-cage-type uncertainty with 50/50 chances. However, here we are only
interested in a very simple question: is the violation of AM one of the drivers
of cooperation in the PD game. Our experiment allows us to screen each
subject for her type, either she is an AM violator or not, and then relate her
type to her behavior in the PD game.
20The test of the hypotheses that the proportions AM violators in the subsample of those
who always took the higher amount (2/82) and those who did not under FC condition
(2/7) is rejected on the 5% level (p-value is 0.045)
21The power of this conclusion is limited by the small sample-size that its based on.
22For example due to distribution-based (e.g., see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000 or Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) or belief-based (Rabin 1993) preferences.
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We only look at the data for subjects who chose the higher amount in
both tasks 1 and 2. Only for this subgroup we have su¢ cient condence that
a choice of dominated lottery in task 3 is a violation of AM. It is natural to
suppose that those subjects who violate AM in our simple setting would also
tend to violate AM in the more complex strategic setting. Based on this we
would expect AM violators to cooperate in the PD game at higher rate than
non-violators. But surprisingly we cannot quite conclude this from the data.
The proportion of cooperators amongst those who took the higher amount
in tasks 1 and 2 and did not violate AM is 42.8% (18/42). Amongst those
who did violate AM the proportion is higher, 55.6% (5/9), but the di¤erence
is not signicant (the p-value is 0.45).
Result 2: Violation of AM does not imply cooperative behavior in the
prisoners dilemma game.
Thus, we can reject the H3 hypothesis. This suggests that violation of AM
does not have an important impact on the cooperation rates in the PD game.
As a result, there may be a fundamental disconnection between violation of
AM and what is known in the literature as the disjunction e¤ect.
4.3 Discussion
Savages theory is prescriptive. It guides a decision maker in making consis-
tent decisions. A crucial ingredient in this process is the formulation of the
state space. The state space so constructed has to do with only those phe-
nomena that are beyond the decision makers perceived control. As such, the
decision maker should not believe that her decisions a¤ect the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of states. Acts have to be independent of beliefs over states.
Dependence, if any, should be built into the model.
Take our task three for example. Readers may agree that the relevant
decision problem is as depicted below:
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L R
h 75 85
l 25 35
This may indeed be so, in the sense that a decision maker can be easily
persuaded that this is indeed the rightstate space to consider. In fact, in
our Uncertainty treatment most of our subjects seem to have such a construct
without any persuasion. However, in real life matters may be complex and
decision makers may not agree on the right way to formulate the state space.
For example, in the Ambiguity treatment, decision makers may believe that
the experimenter tampers with the number of balls after she has made her
decision In such a case, she may add a hypothetical state m as depicted
below. If so, then her choice of L over R would not violate AM at all.
L R
h 75 85
m 75 35
l 25 35
To reduce the chance of this happening, in our experiments, we took
adequate measures. i.e., the bingo cage not touched by the experimenters
throughout the experiment. If we did indeed succeed in ruling out such
perceptions, then what could have gone wrong?
Our hunch is along the lines of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995). Construct-
ing a state space is not always easy. The decision maker may not have enough
time or appropriate advice, to formulate the correct state space. In our
Ambiguity treatment, simple as it is, the subject may start wondering about
the actual number of balls in the bingo cage. Yes, the number of balls should
not matter. But the point is that the subject should be able to gure it out.
If not, then how should she decide?
A way out could be that the subject ignores the state space. Instead,
she draws on her past experience. For example, she could determine that
choosing the dominant lottery is akin to her being greedy. Historically, our
subject had been unlucky whenever she was greedy. So she concludes that
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if she were to choose the dominant lottery she would get $35 with a very
high probability and if she were to choose the dominated lottery she would
get $75 with a very high probability. As such she chooses the dominated
lottery. Savage would have rightly concluded that her acts and beliefs are
not independent. We agree. In our simple experiments we could perhaps
teach subjects how to correctlyformulate the state space; or repeating the
experiment might do the trick. But our basic point is that in real life people
are not trained and even if they were there is no guarantee they could be
specify the state space correctly.
Ahn (2008) has more persuasive arguments along these lines. So much
so, that guring out the right state space may be a fruitless (very costly)
exercise. Ahn shows how to avoid the complexities of the state space by
directly assigning probabilities to lotteries. In this framework Ahn obtains a
representation but notice, since there is no state space, AM is vacuous.
5 Conclusions
Our objective was to design a simple and direct test of the Axiom of Monotonic-
ity. This axiom is fundamental for most theories of choice under uncertainty.
Yet, to this date we do not have a reliable test of AM. In a nutshell, the
axiom says that if the decision maker would have made the same choice in
all contingencies after the uncertainty is resolved she would have made the
same choice even before the uncertainty is resolved. This statement is so
simple and intuitive that it would be di¢ cult to doubt its empirical validity.
However, an intriguing evidence from the literature on the disjunction e¤ect
points to a possible violation of AM in real decisions, which suggests that a
careful test of AM may be needed. We designed such a test and presented
the results in this paper.
Our test was placed in the decision-theoretic setting and examined be-
havior both under simple uncertainty and under ambiguity. Results could be
summarized as follows: (i) AM in not violated in the most basic environment
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under simple uncertainty but it is violated in a signicant proportion under
ambiguity; (ii) a 15-20% of our subjects took lower amount of money when
higher was available and for this subgroup AM is also likely to be violated in
a signicant proportion; and nally, (iii) AM violators do tend to cooperate
more in the strategic setting of the prisoners dilemma but this di¤erence is
not signicant.
The evidence indicates that one should be careful when applying monotonic-
ity in the decision problems without objective probabilities. Our results favor
approaches to theoretical modeling that do not assume AM. Amongst these
are the case-based approach by Gilboa and Schmeidler and the state-free
approach of Ahn. Lastly, our experiments also illustrate the divide between
decision theory and game theory. Strategic uncertainty and possible social
(or other regarding) preferences are likely the dominant determinant of the
behavior in the game like prisoners dilemma.
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Appendix
A Instructions
Below is the English version of the instructions. The instructions below are
those used in the Uncertainty treatment. In the Ambiguity treatment the
changes were that the text in [] was added and the text in {} was deleted.
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. From this moment on no talking is allowed.
If you have a question after we nish reading the instructions, please raise
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question
in privacy.
The experiment consists of 4 tasks that will be presented to you in se-
quence (one after another). In each task you will be asked to make a single
decision.
Earnings
The amount you earn in this experiment will be paid to you in cash at
the end of the experiment. The funding for this experiment was provided by
an external grant from Asociation Mexicana de Cultura.
You will be paid according to the following rule:
50 pesos for coming on time to the experiment + 1
2
* (the points that you
earn in each of the four tasks of the experiment).
Privacy
In this experiment you are completely anonymous. The experimental pro-
cedure that will be described to you in detail insures that NO ONE including
the experimenters will be able to know which decision was made by you.
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Tasks and Decisions
You will be seated at the computer terminal which is shielded by blinders
to insure your complete privacy. In front of you there is a folded card with
a number which will identify you throughout the experiment. You will use
this number to make your decisions and also to redeem your payment.
After we nish reading these instructions and answer any questions that
you may have, you will be asked to follow the instructions on the computer
screen. The software will guide you through the tasks of the experiment.
When we start the experiment you will see the following screen:
Figure 1
Please enter your identication number which is written on the card in
front of you. Make sure that you copy the number correctly. If you make a
mistake we will not be able to pay you your earnings.
Next you will be asked to complete a series of comprehension questions.
These questions ensure that you have properly understood the instructions.
You will not be allowed to proceed with the experiment unless you have
answered all questions correctly. Once you have answered the instructions
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the Task 1 of the experiment begins.
TASK 1: The task is very simple. On the screen (Figure 2) you see two
boxes each containing a single number.
Figure 2
This screen is just an example. In the experiment the numbers in boxes
may be switched.
All you have to do is to choose a box (left or right) by clicking on the
appropriate button labeled either Leftor Right.The number inside of
the box that you choose represents the number of points that you earn in
this task.
TASK 2: The instructions for task 2 are exactly the same as for task 1.
The only di¤erence between tasks 1 and 2 is the numbers in the two boxes.
TASK 3:
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Figure 3
This screen is just an example. In the experiment the numbers in boxes
may be switched.
In this task (Figure 3) you see 4 boxes. The boxes are grouped horizon-
tally into two rows and also vertically into two columns.
You are asked to choose a column (left or right) by clicking on the appro-
priate button labeled either Leftor Right.
The number of points you earn is equal to the number in box which is
(i) inside of the column that you have selected and also
(ii) inside of the row which will be decided randomly at the end of
the experiment by a draw of a single ball from a bingo cage. This is done in
the following way:
The bingo cage in front of the room contains [forty] balls that are labeled
with numbers between 1 and 40. No two balls have the same number. {The
number of balls in the bingo cage is decided by the experimenter.} After
everyone has completed the experiment one of the participants will be ran-
domly selected to spin the bingo cage and draw a single ball. If the number
on the ball is 20 then the top row is chosen. If the number on the ball is
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di¤erent from 20 then the bottom row is chosen.
TASK 4:
Figure 4
This task is similar to task 3. The di¤erence is that now you are ran-
domly matched with one other person in this room. In Figure 4 you see 4
boxes. The boxes are grouped horizontally into two rows and also vertically
into two columns. Each box contains two numbers. The number labeled
You earn:represents the number of points that you earn when that box is
selected. Similarly, the number labeled He/she earns:represents the num-
ber of points that the person you are matched with earns when that box is
selected.
Which box is selected depends on your decision as well as on the decision
of the other person that you are matched with. Both you and the other
person simultaneously choose a column (left or right) by clicking on the ap-
propriate button labeled either Leftor Right.The box which is selected
for payment lies
(i) inside of the column that you have chosen and also
(ii) it is inside of the row which depends on what the other person
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has done: if he/she chose left, then the top row is selected; and if he/she
chose right, the bottom row is selected.
The order of tasks
In the experiment you will rst complete tasks 1 and 2 but the order in
which they appear is decided randomly. This means that you may encounter
task 2 as rst and task 1 as second. Then you complete tasks 3 and 4.
Again their order is decided randomly and you may complete task 4 before
you complete task 3. When everyone is nished with all four tasks you will
be asked to ll out a short questionnaire. After that one randomly chosen
participant will draw a ball from the bingo cage to determine which row is
played in the Task 3.
Payment
When everyone is nished with the experiment the experimenter will put
earnings of each student into a separate envelope and write the students
identication number on the top of the envelope. Then, one of the students
in the room will be randomly selected to distribute the envelopes to everyone
else in the room. To receive your earnings you will be asked to exchange the
card with your identication number for the envelope which contains your
earnings and has the same number written on the top of it. When you get
your envelope you may leave the room.
B Additional tables
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Table 3: Dominated lottery choices in Task 3
Took lower amount in tasks 1 or 2
Order Payo¤s
First task Second task Task 1 Task2
encountered 75 vs. 85 25 vs. 35
Ambiguity 75% 0% 60% 66%
(6/8) (0/1) (3/5) (4/6)
Uncertainty SC 66.7% 80% 75% 66.7%
(4/6) (4/5) (6/8) (2/3)
Uncertainty FC 50% 0% 0% 40%
(2/4) (0/3) (0/2) (2/5)
Total 66.7% 44.4% 60% 57.1%
(12/18) (4/9) (9/15) (8/14)
Note: The ratios in parenthesis give the actual number of observations.
Table 4: Cooperation in PD by groups
Treatments
Ambiguity Uncertainty
Pooled SC FC
Task 3: Satised AM
T1&2: Both high 18/42 35/82 20/43 15/39
42.9% 42.7% 46.5% 38.5%
T1&2: One low 2/3 7/8 2/3 5/5
66.7% 87.5% 66.7% 50%
Task 3: Violated AM
T1&2: Both high 5/9 0/2 0/2 0/0
55.6% 0% 0% -
T1&2: One low 2/6 6/10 4/8 2/2
33.3% 60% 50% 100%
Total 45% 47.1% 46.4% 47.8%
27/60 48/102 26/56 22/46
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